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Foreign Investors in Japan and the 
Search for Consensus on Corporate 
Governance*
Michael Connors
　Firstly, I would like to thank you for inviting me to speak to you at 
Surugadai today. This is an unusual opportunity for me to express 
what I consider to be the views of foreign investors in general on a 
subject which is also, I believe, important to all of you.
　The issues I would like to cover in my remarks today are as follows:
　 · What is corporate governance and why does it matter?
　・Foreign investors―black ships, tourists or fellow citizens?
　・Is there really a philosophical gap?
　・What in the Japanese system needs changing?
　・How can foreign investors perform a useful role in reform?
＊　This is an approximate transcript of a lecture that was delivered, ad lib. and in Japa-
nese, on November 25th 2008. Although Michael Connors was at that time a Senior Advisor 
to Hermes Focus Asset Management, the views expressed herein are those of Dr. Connors 
and do not necessarily refl ect the views or policies of that company.
マイケル・コナーズ　ハーミーズ・ファンド・マネージャーズ主席顧問
1949年生まれ。
1970年　シェフィールド大学卒業（B.A. 経済学、社会史）
1972年　ブラッドフォード大学修士課程修了（M. Sc. 産業行政）
1976年　シェフィールド大学博士課程修了（Ph. D. 日本学）博士課
程在学中に、18ヶ月間、東京大学社会科学研究所にて研究。
1977-78年　シェフィールド大学及び東京大学にてポストドクトラ
ル・フェロー（日本における団体交渉研究）
以後、約30年間、投資銀行家として、国際ビジネスに携わる。いく
つかの銀行・会社の重役を歴任し、現在は、ハーミーズ・ファンド・
マネージャーズの主席顧問を務める。
主な著作：The Race to the Intelligent State（Blackwell, Oxford 
1993; second edition, Capstone, Oxford 1996）
Chaucer’s Shipman of Dartmouth? John Hawley（Richard Webb, 
Dartmouth 2008）
ACGA 『日本のコーポーレート・ガバナンス白書』（共編集者）
比較法文化　第17号（2009）24
What is corporate governance and why does it matter?
　This is a subject that may appear, on the face of it, to be rather dull 
but it is nonetheless an issue which has a direct bearing on the lives 
of everyone and will, if anything, become more important in future. 
The following deﬁ nition is my own oﬀ ering and has no particular au-
thority but it does, I believe, describe what governance is all about:
　Corporate governance is a system of supervision of corporate management 
that seeks to ensure that companies are managed in an effi cient and fair manner 
for the benefi t of society as a whole.
　It should be emphasised that governance is not about management, 
but rather about the supervision of management. 
　In companies which are listed on stock exchanges, governance 
should be underpinned by shareholder democracy and it is, of course, 
subject to overarching public regulation. I believe that there is a 
strong case for saying that shareholder capitalism which is thus suit-
ably constrained has proved to be a potent driving force in dynamic 
economies. This may sound like a rather vague, legalistic or philosoph-
ical statement but I believe that the inadequacies that have emerged 
in corporate governance in Japan have had a signiﬁ cant negative im-
pact on corporate performance and, thereby, on the performance of 
the Japanese economy as a whole. It is therefore a subject which is of 
considerable importance to the Japanese public.
　In 2007, the Morgan Stanley Capital International （MSCI） ﬁ gures 
for return on equity （ROE） in Japanese companies in that universe 
showed an average ROE of just 10.0%, and even this is a level which 
many Japanese companies struggle to achieve. The comparable num-
ber for the world ex-Japan is 17.1%. This wide disparity in perfor-
mance, as expressed by the measure which is arguably the most rele-
vant to shareholders （because it shows the degree of eﬃ  ciency with 
Foreign Investors in Japan and the Search for Consensus on Corporate Governance 25
which the managers of a company is managing the assets which the 
shareholders have put at their disposal） reﬂ ects, I believe, some sys-
tematic weaknesses in Japanese management which, in turn, have 
their roots in weak governance.
Foreign investors in Japan―a growing presence.
　Foreign investors play an important role in the Japanese stock mar-
ket. The percentage of the shares of companies listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange held by foreign investors increased from 5% in 1990 
to more than 27% in 2007. Foreigners are, therefore, sizeable investors 
and, moreover, because they are, on average, forced to take invest-
ment decisions more frequently, they have a disproportionate influ-
ence on the market dynamic. Foreigners often account for 60% or 
more of daily traded volume and it is, of course, this which is the main 
driver of share price movements. As such, foreigners can been seen 
as being, in one sense, leaders in the Tokyo market.
　The attitudes and activities of foreign investors have therefore, un-
derstandably, become a subject of considerable interest to the Japa-
nese ﬁ nancial press and broadcast media. This interest spread more 
widely last year, in the case of Bulldog Sauce vs. Steel Partners. This 
from the start had all the makings of a media soap opera but, although 
it aroused considerable interest at the time, it should not be regarded 
as instructive or as oﬀ ering any satisfactory precedents.
　Bulldog Sauce is, of course, a small and comparatively unimportant 
company which happens to produce and sell a product which has a 
certain iconic value in Japan. Steel Partners is a notably activist asset 
manager which, as a result, tends to have a high media proﬁ le. Steel 
and other activist managers are sometimes accused of being disrup-
tive but many believe that they also have a useful catalytic function. 
They are neither, however, very large, nor very representative of the 
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foreign institutions investing in Japan. 
　In their highly publicised bid for Bulldog, the senior management of 
Steel were often portrayed in the media as villainous assailants, while 
the sometimes publicly emotional and tearful female president of Bull-
dog evoked much public sympathy. The Black Ships, it seemed, had 
come again.
　This reaction of sympathetic solidarity seemed to extend to the 
Bulldog shareholders, who not only rejected Steel’s substantial bid but 
also allowed the management to expend large amounts of sharehold-
ers’ funds in launching a takeover defence strategy and ﬁ ghting the 
ensuing legal proceedings all the way to the Supreme Court. In the 
process, Steel were characterised by the judgement of one court as 
being “abusive” bidders, while the ﬁ nal outcome actually ensured that 
they did not suﬀ er economically as a result of their alleged abusive 
practices. After Steel were forced to retreat （having made a signiﬁ -
cant proﬁ t）, the share price fell sharply and the remaining sharehold-
ers were left signiﬁ cantly impoverished as a result of the aﬀ air. The 
position of the Bulldog management, however, had been protected.
　It is not my intention here in any way to criticise the deliberations 
of the judiciary in this case but the outcome does seem to have re-
ﬂ ected many unintended consequences of the legislation and, I believe, 
raises the question as to whether a mainly legislative approach to is-
sues of this kind is really appropriate.
　In all, shareholder behaviour in this case was economically irrational 
and self-damaging and, in a ﬁ nal irony, the legal judgements appear to 
have made things easier for “abusive bidders” or “greenmailers” in fu-
ture. 
　In the rather febrile mood surrounding the Steel-Bulldog aﬀ air it 
was often asserted that foreign investors are typically short-termist 
and greedy. This is demonstrably untrue. Most large, institutional in-
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vestors manage their huge assets on what is sometimes called a “core 
and satellite” basis. The core portfolio is typically indexed and the sur-
rounding sub-portfolios are managed on the basis of specialist strate-
gies, often sub-contracted to specialist, external managers. The fact 
that the core is usually indexed means that the institutions cannot, in 
effect, sell any stock which forms part of the index. Indexation has 
thus created a new kind of “semi-perpetual” institutional investor. 
　This means that, unless they sell “Japan”, they are long-term （virtu-
ally perpetual） shareholders in index companies. International inves-
tors do, of course, change their asset allocations to diﬀ erent national 
markets from time to time and will therefore increase or decrease 
their overall weightings in Japanese equities, but the portrayal of for-
eign investors as “short-termist” is clearly incorrect.
　The recent crisis in credit markets has evoked in some circles a 
critical reaction against eﬀ orts to reform corporate governance in Ja-
pan along what are perceived to be “European-American” lines. This 
reaction is, in my view, mistaken in a number of ways, not the least 
because there is, in reality, no such thing as a “European-American” 
system of governance. The style of governance varies even as be-
tween countries in Europe and the approach in the United States, 
again, diﬀ ers considerably from that taken in the United Kingdom. I 
would characterise the US approach as “market primacy” and the 
British approach as （again an expression I have invented） “Magna 
Carta populism”.
　In the United States, that bastion of democracy and the protection 
of individual rights, the governance system often seems to be surpris-
ingly unsupportive of the rights of shareholders. There is, however, a 
near-religious belief that, provided only that the market mechanism is 
stable, unfettered and transparent, all issues can be resolved. One 
manifestation of this is the notion of the “Wall Street walk”, that is to 
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say, the right of a shareholder to sell his shares if he is dissatisﬁ ed 
with the way in which a company is being managed. This is supposed 
to exert indirect pressure on managers to improve things in order 
that the shares will again become more desirable and the share price 
rise. It is, at best an indirect mechanism and one about which many 
have philosophical reservations, but it does seem to work quite well in 
many cases.   
　So, although shareholder rights are not necessarily well protected in 
the United States, the market itself is. The message is that you inter-
fere with the market at your peril and, as with the ﬁ ctional character 
Gordon Gekko in the movie Wall Street, the US authorities really do 
deal harshly with those who are found guilty of doing so.
　The American system is also largely based on legislation and this 
does mean that it is sometimes rather slow to respond to unintended 
consequences by legislative reform. 
　Britain’s “Magna Carta populism” is largely principles-based and 
tends to have a rather lighter touch. It strives hard for “democratic” 
fairness, transparency and ﬂ exibility and often uses the ﬂ exible and 
pragmatic notion of “comply or explain”. This latter idea reﬂ ects the 
fact that, in an area as complex as ﬁ nance, it is very diﬃ  cult to frame 
legislation which ﬁ ts all conceivable cases and circumstances. It means 
that adherence to a rule should be mandatory but that, provided that 
a company can give a satisfactory explanation as to why it was inap-
propriate for them to do so, that can be acceptable. This useful princi-
ple is commonly applied in the Combined Code, which has been devel-
oped as the framework for corporate governance in the UK, in an 
accretive manner over a period of years. It is a ﬂ exible and pragmatic 
code which deals easily with the unintended consequences of regula-
tion. For this reason, it is arguably the most advanced system of cor-
porate governance in existence at the moment.
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　But, what of governance in Japan? Here, I would characterise the 
situation as being one which reﬂ ects a kind of managerial pragmatism 
and which depends heavily on legal precedent. It is, I believe, an in-
complete and somewhat ﬂ awed system, although I am optimistic that 
beneﬁ cial changes are in progress. 
　The philosophical and political basis of the current arrangements is 
a general conﬁ dence in the excellence of Japanese management. This 
was a perception which spread well beyond Japan in the past. You 
may remember Ezra Vogel’s global bestseller “Japan as No.1”, which 
extolled the virtues of Japanese management twenty years ago. At 
that time, the objective facts seemed to support Professor Vogel’s 
view and Japan’s conﬁ dence in its corporate managers seemed to be 
justiﬁ ed―but is it still? And if it is, does this mean, as some assert, 
that governance is an unnecessary encumbrance of managers in Ja-
pan?
　Also open to question, I believe, is whether the “hard-wired” legisla-
tive and legal precedent-based approach to corporate governance is 
the most suitable.
　I believe that the messages emerging from Japan’s system of corpo-
rate governance are confused and confusing and that the governance 
project at large is clearly a piece of unfinished business. I believe, 
however―and here I may be guilty of unwarranted optimism―that 
there is an emerging consensus which will result in the introduction 
of satisfactory rules.
Japanese management―superheroes and tarnished heroes
　There can be no denying that the very best Japanese managers are 
among the best in the world. Even many of those who operate within 
a governance environment which most foreign observers would say 
does not provide for adequate supervision of management decision-
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making perform at a very high level and the companies which they 
manage are world leaders. The best, then, are still brilliant, but some 
others are clearly not.
　There are many instances of mismanagement in Japanese compa-
nies but two particular patterns are notably common and seem to be 
typically Japanese.
　Where companies have been very proﬁ table in the past, it is quite 
common for their balance sheets to become unnecessarily inflated. 
That is to say that cash and marketable securities are held indeﬁ nite-
ly for no good reason. In some of the more extreme cases, 70‒80% of 
the total assets of companies are held in this form, which, in eﬀ ect, 
turns them into unlicensed investment banks with smaller operating 
companies attached. This is not what the shareholders intended to in-
vest in. Inﬂ ated balance sheets also, where the returns on the non-op-
erating account are minimal or even negative, often dramatically 
erode that key return on equity measure. In some cases, operating 
proﬁ t margins of more than 50% are diluted to the 10‒15% level. This 
is clearly not in the interests of shareholders, so, for whose beneﬁ t are 
the cash and securities held? Where capital expenditure is already 
well covered and where the management has no short or medium-
term plans to make corporate acquisitions, this seems to be nothing 
more than some kind of management “comfort blanket” and cannot 
reasonably be justiﬁ ed. In such circumstances, excess funds should be 
returned to the owners of the company―that is to say, to the share-
holders.
　The second typical strategic failing in Japanese companies is irratio-
nal diversiﬁ cation. This often arises where operational managers seek 
to diversify into new areas not because they should but because they 
can. Such decisions are often supported by senior managers and com-
pany presidents who almost invariably come from operational back-
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grounds and fail, because of their lack of strategic insight, and for 
want of any externally imposed ﬁ nancial discipline, to take sensible 
proﬁ t-maximising and corporate value enhancing decisions. This think-
ing leads, for example an audio maker to manage golf courses and an 
automotive instrument maker to enter a medical equipment market 
which it is technically able to supply but which its management does 
not understand.
　This pattern reﬂ ects both the greatest strength and the greatest 
weakness of managers in much of corporate Japan. Because senior 
managers almost invariably have many years of experience in many 
areas of the company’s business, their operational management skills 
are usually of a very high level. In this regard they compare very fa-
vourably with managers in other countries and this level of operation-
al expertise is highly appreciated. However, their lack of broader stra-
tegic and financial training and experience often means that, while 
they are very strong as managers of operations （jigyō）, they are quite 
weak as managers of the total enterprise （kigyō）. 
　The systematic failure of governance in general, and of ﬁ nancial dis-
cipline in particular, has its roots not in any particular philosophical 
stance but, rather, in recent Japanese history. In the period of rapid 
economic recovery and growth after the Second World War, growth 
was largely ﬁ nanced by bank lending and the banks were therefore in 
a position to impose financial disciplines on management when this 
was necessary. As the inﬂ uence of the banks virtually disappeared in 
later years, there opened up a vacuum of ﬁ nancial discipline and those 
who are now in a position to ﬁ ll that vacuum have so far failed to do 
so. Why is this so?
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Shareholder capitalism vs. stakeholder capitalism in Japan―
myth and reality 
　Managers and the interest groups that represent them often char-
acterise Japanese capitalism as “stakeholder capitalism” and portray it 
as contrasting with the “shareholder capitalism” of “the West”.  This 
notion is, in fact, a purely political construct and has no basis in Japa-
nese law, at least insofar as it applied to listed companies. 
　If the owners of an unlisted company wish to characterise it as a 
manifestation of “stakeholder capitalism” and to operate it in a manner 
which they believe makes that expression meaningful, they are, of 
course, at liberty to do so, within the constraints of the laws of Japan. 
However, once a company has taken the step of obtaining a stock ex-
change listing, it is subject to the explicit and implicit contractual ar-
rangements with the owners （shareholders） into which it has entered. 
A stock exchange-listed company is bound by the rules of shareholder 
capitalism. In this regard, the relevant laws in Japan do not diﬀ er in 
essence from those in the United States or the United Kingdom. Japa-
nese listed companies, then, are as much part of the system of share-
holder capitalism as are their US or UK counterparts and there is no 
real scope for debate about this. 
　The confusion which currently surrounds the incomplete system of 
governance in Japan allows the managers to protect their autonomy―
which, naturally, they do―but this does not necessarily beneﬁ t either 
shareholders or the economy at large. The notion of “Japanese-style” 
“stakeholder capitalism” can too easily become a smokescreen for in-
terest groups protecting their own positions. The current laws allow 
managers to choose between a system of a company-with-committees 
and a kansayaku （statutory auditor） system. Insofar as the kansayaku 
have an essentially advisory role and have no real power over the ex-
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ecutive management （including having no jinjiken, or power of hire-
and-ﬁ re） it is hardly surprising that the managers of 97% of Tokyo 
Stock Exchange listed companies have opted for this system over the 
company-with-committees, whose external directors do, in theory at 
least, have such powers and thereby impinge on management autono-
my. 
　Does it matter if good companies have bad governance? Yes; be-
cause good governance provides safeguards against managerial incom-
petence and the longer-term erosion of corporate value.
　Do good governance structures guarantee good companies? No. 
Even when the structures are as good as they can be, there may be 
situations in which both the managers and those supervising them 
can make fundamental errors. 
　It is also the case that inherently sound systems of governance, 
such as the company-with-committees, can be implemented in an un-
sound manner. For example, a year or so ago, I visited a company 
which notionally had a company-with-committees system but where 
the remuneration committee not only had a majority of inside direc-
tors but was also chaired by an insider. And this was so in spite of the 
fact that the company had a stock option system as part of the remu-
neration for the senior management. This arrangement would, I be-
lieve, be quite unthinkable anywhere where the system was being im-
plemented properly.
Pressures for change
　I believe that the Japanese system of corporate governance is, then, 
unsatisfactory and incomplete and the pressures for change are grow-
ing. 
　In the ﬁ rst place, equity markets are becoming ever more globa-
lised and Japanese companies cannot persist in the pretence that they 
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can and do operate in a fundamentally diﬀ erent way from listed com-
panies elsewhere in the developed world. This would be true even if 
the putative Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism had been success-
ful. The inferior ROE numbers suggest that it has not. 
　Also, the strange view that operating companies can in some way 
be regarded as “savings boxes”, with inﬂ ated and ineﬃ  cient balance 
sheets, cannot be allowed to persist, not least because the ageing Japa-
nese public will have an ever growing need for dividend income over 
the next few years.
　There is also a clear need for industrial-level rationalisation in some 
sectors. The recent Oji/Hokuetsu aﬀ air was a straw in the wind in 
this regard. The management of Oji made a friendly approach to 
Hokuetsu, suggesting a merger which many commentators believed 
was in the broader interests of the Japanese paper and pulp industry 
and, ultimately, of the shareholders of both companies. That this bid, 
which subsequently became hostile, was eventually defeated by de-
fence measures which included what many regarded as an unwar-
ranted and irresponsible issuance of shares to a third party, was felt 
to reﬂ ect a case where the interests of the shareholders, the industry 
and, indeed, the Japanese economy, had been subjugated to those of 
the incumbent management of the target company.
The elephant in the room―conﬂ icts of interest
　So, the pressures for reform in corporate governance are not only 
coming from abroad. There are powerful forces at work in Japan too. 
So, why are the shareholders not pushing more vigorously for reform? 
The answer lies in the so-called “Japanese Way”; the outdated and in-
eﬃ  cient system of cross shareholdings and quiet reciprocity. This al-
lows the managers of companies to protect themselves and one anoth-
er from the forces of change.
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　The natural representatives of the interests of the shareholders, and 
the people best equipped to ﬁ ll the vacuum of ﬁ nancial discipline, are 
the potentially very powerful institutional investors. They are very 
knowledgeable and potentially very inﬂ uential and yet they remain si-
lent. Why is this? One of the main reasons is that, as managers of cor-
porate pension funds and as sometime intermediaries in financial 
transactions on behalf of the companies in which they invest their cli-
ents’ funds, the institutions which control the bulk of equity funds 
have a powerful conﬂ ict of interest. This is because they do not wish 
to oﬀ end important actual or potential corporate clients by being seen 
to criticise the management. They therefore tend to remain silent.
　Conﬂ icts of interest, of course, exist everywhere and in all aspects 
of economic, political and social life but corporate governance systems 
in some other parts of the world are far better developed to cope with 
this kind of problem than they are in Japan, where the problem has 
become “the elephant in the room”. This English expression refers to 
a problem which has become so large that everyone is aware of its 
existence, but, because dealing with it is perceived to be very diﬃ  cult, 
everyone chooses to ignore it. Clearly, this is not a situation which can 
be allowed to persist but, in the shorter term, it explains why the role 
played by foreign institutional investors in Japan can be particularly 
beneﬁ cial. 
　Even foreign institutional investors, of course, often do business for 
Japanese clients and therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, they have 
the same conﬂ icts of interest as the domestic institutions. However, on 
the whole, they have fewer conﬂ icts and they come from places where 
such conﬂ icts are more readily recognised, confronted and resolved. It 
is no coincidence, however, that it has been the large, public and oth-
erwise independent pension funds, such as CalPERS, CalSTRS, 
Hermes and Railpen, which have inherently very few conﬂ icts of in-
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terest, that have been among the most active advocates of governance 
reform, in Japan and elsewhere. Foreign investors, on other words 
have conﬂ icts of interest but they have fewer of them and are better 
at dealing with them, and they are therefore likely to continue to be 
important change agents.
What in the Japanese system needs changing?
　As the foregoing comments clearly imply, it is important that the 
spurious notion that Japanese capitalism is stakeholder capitalism 
should be repudiated and that there should be a clear recognition that 
it is the shareholders （not the managers） who are the owners of listed 
companies.
　In pursuit of this and, in order that an appropriate mechanism for 
the supervision of corporate management may be put in place, it is 
important that those who are best placed to represent the owners （i.e. 
shareholders） of listed companies should speak up. Japan’s ﬁ nancial 
institutions need, either voluntarily or by compulsion, to deal with 
their conﬂ icts of interest.
　Although I believe that a properly implemented company-with-com-
mittees system is inherently superior to the currently predominant 
kansayaku system, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect that this sys-
tem can be made universal and mandatory any time soon. However, 
this problem could be signiﬁ cantly ameliorated if Japanese companies 
were compelled to introduce a meaningful number of well-qualified 
and genuinely independent directors. Neither independence nor com-
petence alone is suﬃ  cient; external directors need to have both. And 
they need to be appointed in suﬃ  cient numbers that they cannot be 
ignored or suppressed by the executive directors.
　I have often heard it said that “there are no such people in Japan”, 
which seems to me to be a completely nonsensical assertion. If Japa-
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nese managers are talented （which they are） why is it only in Japan 
that nobody is available to serve as independent external directors? 
The answer, of course, is that there are plenty such people but there 
is no well established system for their recruitment, nor any desire on 
the part of the self-protecting management groups to establish one. 
　A vibrant community of independent, external directors, however, 
brings great benefits to businesses and to the economy as a whole 
and I believe that, once Japanese managers overcome their initial op-
position to any form of external interference in their aﬀ airs, they will 
come to appreciate what value these people bring.
　It is sometimes said that such day-to-day supervision of managers 
in Japan is unnecessary because the shareholders’ meeting is all-pow-
erful. This may be true in theory but, in truth, such assertions have 
little credibility. Countries cannot be governed by referendum and nor 
can companies, and this would be true even if the annual meeting of-
fered a genuine and transparent channel for shareholders views, 
which is does not. There are, in fact, various technical reasons why it 
does not. Most importantly, far too many annual meetings are clus-
tered in one or two days in late June. This makes is very diﬃ  cult for 
shareholders to table or to deliberate on and vote on, resolutions. 
There is simply too much going on at once. 
　Another undesirable feature of the current Japanese system is that 
there is no requirement for the trust banks which administer proxy 
voting on resolutions at shareholder meetings to make the results of 
the polls public. They can simply say whether a resolution passed or 
failed and do not need to publish the statistics of the vote. I would 
suggest that for democracy to be done it must be seen to be done and 
that there is no reason why there should not be full transparency in 
shareholder voting. This problem could easily be solved.
　Finally, and I believe that this will be the most diﬃ  cult reform to 
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achieve in Japan, there does need to develop some form of free mar-
ket in corporate control. In Japan, this seems a very foreign notion but 
the idea that companies have “best owners”, that is to say, potentially 
the most eﬃ  cient owners, and that the control of companies should be 
subject to market forces, has considerable support elsewhere and has 
been shown to be largely beneﬁ cial. Japanese managers must not con-
tinue to be supported in protecting their own interests where a 
change in corporate ownership is likely to bring enhanced value to 
shareholders and broader beneﬁ ts to society. As has been seen from 
the unintended consequences which occurred in the Steel/Bulldog 
case and, I believe, in the more recent TCI/J-Power case, it is diﬃ  cult 
to frame legislation which will deal satisfactorily with all contested at-
tempts to change corporate control. In this sense, the UK system in 
which a publicly appointed Takeover Panel adjudicates on the cases 
referred to it on a case-by-case basis is perhaps preferable to the rath-
er confused current system in Japan.
　So, in summary, I believe that transparency in governance and gen-
uinely independent supervision of corporate management in Japan is 
essential and that this can be achieved through increased shareholder 
power and the introduction of large numbers of genuinely indepen-
dent directors.
　There are now often bitter debates between domestic defenders of 
the status quo and foreign advocates of change but I believe that, al-
though it may take some time, the achievement of a consensus should 
ultimately be easy. The ideal is to facilitate a transparent, expertly in-
termediated, and reasonable supervision of corporate management 
creating a balanced combination of market forces, shareholder democ-
racy and legitimate regulation. In the end, there should be no philo-
sophical gap because we all want the same thing―dynamic and proﬁ t-
able Japanese companies. As Winston Churchill once said: “Democracy 
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is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time.” 
　I believe that this can also be said of shareholder democracy in a 
dynamic economy. 
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講演会資料
＊　この資料は、2008年11月25日、駿河台大学において比較法研究所主催の公開講
演会において、マイケル・コナーズ博士によって使用され、配布されたパワーポ
イント資料をそのまま掲載するものである。講演は日本語で行われたが、講演の
詳しい内容については、併せて掲載されている英文の論文を参照されたい。
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